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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
IN RHODE ISLAND.
The first settlers in Portsmouth, Rhode Island, in 1637,
started out with a more definite judicial system than the other
settlers in this state. They incorporated themselves into a
"Body Politick" and then, following the example of the Old
Testament, they elected a judge to exercise authority among
themselves, his functions being, therefore, executive as well as
judicial.*
Before the end of the first year of the existence of this
infant community, the elders were associated with the judge,
to help in the administration of justice and the drawing up of
rules and laws "according to God." z Col. Recs., R. I., p. 63.
They were directed to report quarterly to the town meeting for
revision and approval, the ultimate source of power thus
remaining in the town's freemen.
The next year a part of the settlers moved to the south end
of the island and founded Newport. Those who remained at
Portsmouth re-incorporated themselves again into a civil body
politic under King Charles and "unto his laws according to the
matters of justice." dA., p. 7o. They increased the number of
elders to eight, with a more distinct delegation of judicial power
* The 7th day of the first month, 1638.
We whose names are underwritten do here solemnly in the presence of
Jehovah incorporate ourselves into a Bodie Politick and as he shall help, will
submit our persons, lives and estates unto our Lord Jesus Christ, the King of
Kings and Lord of Lords and to all those perfect and most absolute laws of
his given us in his holy word of truth, to be guided and judged thereby.
Exod. 24: 3, 4.
II Chron. '1: 3.
n Kings 11: 17.
(Signed by) WILL M CODDINGTON
and eighteen others.
The 7th day of the first month, 1638.
We that are Freemen Incorporate of this Bodie Politicke, do elect and
constitute William Coddington, Esquire, a Judge amongst us, and so covenant
to yield all due honour unto him according to the laws of God, and so far as in
us lyes to maintain the honor and privileges of his place which shall hereafter
be ratifyed according unto God, the Lord helping us so to do.
WmImtm ASPmiWALL, Sc'ry.
(i Col. Rees., R. I. 52.)
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and a provision for trial by jury in cases of importance, but
only one was "to be ruler or judge amongst us." do., p. 70.
The settlers at Newport also confided judicial power to ajudge with elders, the judge to have double vote however.
do., p. 87.
The next year, 164o, brought about the union of the two
towns into a self-constituted state, a most remarkable occur-
rence, the full import of which has never been sufficiently
recognized by historians. It was ordered that the Chief Magis-
trate of the Island should be called Governor, and the next
Deputy Governor, and the rest of the magistrates, Assistants,
and they were all invested also with the offices of Justices of
the Peace. do., p. ioi. Provision was made for courts, con-
sisting of magistrates and jurors, to meet quarterly at Newport
and Portsmouth alternately, do., p. io3. This system continued
with slight changes until 1647, when Providence and Warwick
united with Newport and Portsmouth under the first charter.
If I have passed by until now the judicial systems of Provi-
dence and Warwick it is because there is little to be said on the
subject until after the adoption of the first charter. It would
seem that the Providence settlers transacted their judicial
business, as well as all other public business, in town meeting,
but the loss of the early records leaves the success of this
system unknown to us. A provision for compulsory arbitration
adopted in 1640 (do., p. 27) indicates that it had not worked
satisfactorily-a result naturally to be anticipated from the
known litigious character of these settlers.
The Warwick settlers maintained that they had no right to
create a government for themselves without the sanction of the
English government, so they remained without government
until they joined the union of the towns under the first charter
in E647, and therefore until then they had no judicial system.
Therefore, when the four separate towns or colonies united
under the first charter, Providence had an unsatisfactory judicial
system, the details of which are unknown to us, Warwick had
no judicial system, and Portsmouth and Newport had a well-
outlined system with judges and juries.
We come next to the judicial system after the adoption of
the first charter and the remarkable code of laws then adopted.
Each of the four towns had its president and four assistants.
do., p. 19r. There was a general court of trials consisting of
the president and the assistants from the towns, and this was
the predecessor of our present Supreme Court. do., pp. xg9,
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X92. This court was ambulatory, and in whichever of the four
towns it met, the head officers of the town sat with it, but
without any vote. This proved so unsatisfactory that in 1650
they were given "equal authority to vote and act with the
general officers." Durfee, Gleanings from the Judicial History
of Rhode Island, p. 9.
There were also town courts for the trial of minor criminal
and civil cases. In 1658 it was enacted that all causes, except
cases of high crime, should be tried in the town courts,with a
right of appeal to the general court. E Col. Recs. 237. This
system remained in force until the reception of the royal char-
ter in 1663, except during the interruption caused by Codding-
ton's usurpation.
Under this charter the governor, deputy governor and
assistants exercised certain judicial as well as executive func-
tions. The charter did not create courts however; it authorized
the General Assembly to create them. A t its first session the
Assembly directed a general court of trials at Newport every
year in May and October (2 Col. Recs. 26)-afterwards altered
to March and September (2 Col. Recs. 31)-so as not to interfere
with the sessions of the General Assembly, the court to consist
of the governor, deputy governor, with at least six-then
changed to three-assistants. Special courts were provided for
urgent cases, and a local court for Providence and Warwick for
petty cases.
The superior court thus created finally sat only in Newport
instead of visiting all the towns, and it contained no town
officers, both of which changes tended to raise the character of
the court. But as the judges received no pay, their attendance was
irregular, and to remedy this the number of assistants on the
court was reduced and they were paid three, and afterwards
four, shillings for each day's attendance, but they were fined
twice as much for being absent without cause, and worse yet,
a fine of five pounds for each absentee, when no quorum
appeared. 2 Col. Recs. 64.
The next important change was made in 1729 when the
colony was for the first time divided into counties;* New-
port County, containing the islands; Providence County, con-
taining the old town of Providence, later divided into North
*4 Col. Recs. 427. It is noteworthy that the act does not incorporate these
counties; Bristol County is the only county in the state that is explicitly
stated to be a corporation. 5 Col. Recs. 208.
JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN RHODE ISLAN4AD.
Providence, Smithfield, Foster, Gloucester, Scituate, Johnston,
Cranston, Burrillville, and seven other towns; and King's
County, now Washington County, containing the old towns of
North and South Kingstown and Westerly, and now divided
into eight towns. Bristol County was afterwards created (in
1746-7) out of territory recovered from Massachusetts, and
Kent County out of territory set off from Providence County.
A criminal and civil court was established for each county
with justices of the peace for minor offenses. 4 Col. Recs. 428.
The criminal court was made up of the justices of the county
and the civil court was made up of "four judicious and skillful
persons" chosen by the General Assembly from the county they
were to represent (do., p. 432), commissioned by the governor
to hold office during good behavior, at first, but in 1733 their
tenure was made annual, do., p. 484. The higher court met
exclusively at Newport, under the title of "The General Court
of Trial and General Goal Delivery," with jurisdiction in civil
and mainly in criminal cases, declared to be as ample as that of
the Court of Common Pleas, King's Bench or Exchequer in his
Majesty's Kingdom of England. Pub. Laws, 1730, p. 7. This
lasted for nearly a century, in spite of the disadvantages result-
ing from its meeting only in Newport and from the political
character of the court, consisting, as it did, of the governor or
deputy governor and the assistants, who might or might not
happen to be qualified for judicial work. It could not have
sufficed had this judicial work been other than very simple and
with but little development of equity powers.
In 1746 two changes were made, rendered necessary by the
increase of business and population.*
The General Assembly thereafter chose annually five judges,
a chief justice and four associate justices, and provision was
made for two sessions a year in every county. Thus an impor-
tant step was taken in separating the judicial from the execu-
tive function. We shall see later that the complete separation
of thejudicial from the legislative function did not take place
until after the adoption of the constitution in 1842. It is inter-
esting to follow the steps by which the three important divis-
ions of the government-the legislative, the executive and thejudicial-have become separated. At first they were all exer-
cised by the General Assembly. Then came the first crude
*See also the Act of x746, p. 27, P. L. of R. I., from 1745 to 1752, entitled
"An Act for the more regular Establishing a Superior Court of Judicature,
Court of Assize and General Delivery throughout the Colony."
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separation of the judicial from the executive power, in 1746.
In 1780 the General Assembly declared by preamble that it was
incompatible with the constitution of the state for legislative
and judicial powers to be united in the same person, and there-
fore it was enacted that after the next election, no member of
either house of the General Assembly should fill the office of a
justice of the Supreme Court. In 1833 a similar act debarred
judges of the court of common pleas from sitting in the General
Assembly. Apparently no one saw the inconsistency of thus
barring the judiciary from the legislature while continuing to
allow the legislature to exercise judicial power and that degree
of political development was not reached until the middle of
the next century.
As all powers were originally exercised by the General
Assembly, when it became necessary to distinguish between
them, there were two ways in which this could be done-either
by grant from the General Assembly or by assumption of the
power by the executive or judiciary. Courts have always, in
part at least, increased their jurisdiction, by the assumption of
power, indeed so well is this known, it has led to a maxim of
the law that the good chancellor is he who increases his juris-
diction. Our courts in Rhode Island have increased their
poweys in some respects by assuming jurisdiction, especially in
equity, and particularly so since the adoption of the present
constitution in x842. But it was more natural, during our
earlier history, when our legislature was strong and our
judiciary was weak and not composed of lawyers, that the
source of increased jurisdiction of the judiciary should be the
legislature, and that is where we find it. See P. L. 1767, p. 74.
In 1749 the superior court was authorized to grant divorces,
a power theretofore exercised by the General Assembly. As
Judge Durfee says, in his "Gleanings from the Judicial History
of Rhode Island": "Contrary to the usual belief, the causes
for divorce remain still almost the same as they were fixed by
the General Assembly in 1798." At Page 35, Judge Durfee
gives further examples, as follows, of the exercise of judicial
powers of the General Assembly before their delegation to the
courts of law:
"Thus the assembly early began and long continued to grant
divorces. In 1665 it granted a divorce for adultery of the wife
on her confession and at the same time sentenced her to pay a
fine and be whipped. In 1667 a husband and wife joined in
petitioning for divorce. The assembly could find no cause for
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divorce, but authorized them to live apart. In i667 John Belew
petitioned to be divorced from his wife, and the assembly, find-
ing from the first they had "lived very discontentedly, sh'e com-
plaining of his insufficiency," granted the petition. Sometimes
the assembly granted alimony as well as divorce, or, in case of
desertion by the husband, sequestered his estate for the support
of the wife and children without a divorce. Just, but despotic!
Of course after power to divorce was granted to the superior
court, the jurisdiction languished, but it continued, neverthe-
less, to be invoked in exceptional cases, which either were not
provided for by statute or were too flimsy or too whimsical for
judicial treatment. There is an uncanny tradition, still vaguely
surviving, that in such cases grave legislators were sometimes
plied in the lobby with solicitations and arguments too peculiar
for public discussion. After the constitution the more usual
course for the assembly was, not to hear the petition, but to
authorize the Supreme Court to hear by special act, if without
such act the court was incompetent. Divorces, however, were
granted as late as i85o. In January, 1851, the assembly had
several petitions pending before it and transferred them,
together with all documents and depositions in support of them,
to the Supreme Court, "where," the resolution of transfer
tartly remarks, "the said petitions should have been filed," and
at the same time authorized and required the court to try them.
The same body continued to exercise jurisdiction in cases of
insolvency until 1832, when a statute confined it to the Supreme
Court (see P. Laws, Ed. of 1844, p. 210), reserving, however,
a right of appeal to the General Assembly, and this continued
until 1857, when the decision in the famous case of Taylor v.
Place, 4 R. I. 324, put an end to it.
We have seen that our Rhode Island forefathers did not con-
sider a knowledge of law essential to a judge.* Together with
* Nor did the judge charge the jury, probably because, if a layman, he did
not know how to. The code of 1647 directed the charging of the jury by the
court, but in x699, in a report of the Earl of Bellomont to the English Gov-
ernmefit, it is stated that the courts in this colony "give no directions to the
jury nor sum up the evidence to them." This remained the custom until
about 1833, as appears from the charge to the jury in the famous trial of
Ephraim K. Avery, charged with the murder of Sarah M. Cornell:
"Until the statute, passed within a few years, making it the duty of the
presiding judge to charge the jury upon the law, no court in this state had
adopted the practice of instructing the jury upon the application of the law
to the facts. The construction this court has placed upon the statute is,
never to sum up the facts in the case, but merely to explain the law upon a
supposed state of facts, and leave the jury to determine the facts, and apply
the law.
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this ignorance of law there was a contempt for lawyers and a
vague dread of equity, perhaps the result of traditions and
vague remembrances brought from England by the first settlers
who lived during the exercise of star chamber methods in
England and the times when the conflict raged between the
system of common law and the development of equity powers.
This conflict culminated in the contest for supremacy, aggra-
vated by personal motives and bitter personal feelings between
Coke, the great Chief Justice of England, the representative of
the common law system, and Lord Bacon, the great Chancellor,
the representative of the equity system.
Equity powers were slowly developed in Rhode Island, and
indeed there was at first but little opportunity for their develop-
ment in the simple life of the early settlers here. It is not pro-
posed now to treat of the exercise of equity powers by the
General Assembly, but only of the conferring of such powers
by the legislature upon the judiciary. The first grant was in
1667 (see p. 61 P. L. 1667), and was a grant to proceed accord-
ing to the rules of equity where any penalty, conditional estate
or equity of redemption was sued for, and to chancerize for-
feitures. It was not until 1798 (Laws 1798, p. 274) that the
court was empowered, by an act of the General Assembly, to
entertain a bill in equity to redeem a mortgage, and not until
1822 (Laws 1822, p. 211), within almost the memory of men
now living, that the court could entertain a bill to foreclose a
mortage. These few examples are enough to show how far
behind the mother country we were in our exercise of chancery
or equity powers by our Supreme Court. This is still further
shown when we find that it was not until 1829 (Laws, Oct.
Session, 1829, p. 46), that the court acquired jurisdiction, by
act of the General Assembly, over cases relating to trusts
created by assignments for the benefit of creditors; not until
1836 over cases relating to trusts generally, to controversies
between co-partners (Laws, Jan, 1836, p. 48, and do., June, 1836,
p. 94), to proceedings against banks for forfeiture of charters
and to bring about liquidation; not until 1837 (Laws 1844, p. 91)
over cases against railroad and turnpike corporations to restrain
violations of their charters, and not until x841 was the Supreme
Court vested by the General Assembly with full equity powers
in case of fraud generally (Laws 1844, p. 89). It is true that to
a limited extent the General Assembly exercised general equity
powers until the Constitution of 1842 was adopted, but if we
try to imagine the results of such exercise of these powers by
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the General Assembly now, when, with the general improve-
ment in education, it is better fitted for their exercise than it
was in "ye olden times," the dire results can easily be foreseen,
and we have an explanation of the fact that persons having
occasion to bring a bill in equity in the last cehtury, prior to
x842 constantly moved out of the state across the line into
Massachusetts or Connecticut, to effect a change of citizenship
to enable suit to be brought in the United States Court, where
that eminent equity judge, Story, presided.
The dread of equity powers is shown to have continued even
down to 1842 by the provision in the Constitution then adopted
that chancery powers can be conferred only on the Supreme
Court. The statutes, as revised after this constitution was
adopted, for the first time invested the Supreme Court with full
equity jurisdiction and the golden age of the development of
this new jurisdiction was fortunate in having at its head our
eminent Chief Justice Ames. Fortunate indeed are the older
members of our bar who have lived and taken part in this
important period of our development of the equity side of our
court. But as regards the common law side of our Supreme
Court a retrograde step was taken in 1847 when the Supreme
Court was vested with original jurisdiction, concurrently with
the court of common pleas, over all civil suits for not less than
one hundred dollars-later, not less than three hundred dollars.
For a Supreme Court should be what its name implies-a court
above all others, a court of last resort, both in law and in
equity, to pass upon the law only. If in addition to these func-
tions, the court is to be also a court of first instance, where is
the court of last resort to which an appeal can be taken?
The act that thus minified the dignity of the higher court
also continued another peculiarity that lasted until 1878-the
right to two jury trials. The result was, generally, that the
first trial was but a preparation for the second trial. Some-
times there were three jury trials-i. e., in the court of common
pleas; second on appeal, in the Supreme Court; and third, if
the two verdicts were contradictory, one more trial was given,
to determine which was right. In order that the ever-increas-
ing business of the court might be disposed of, in 1852 the pre-
vious practice, of having all the judges sit, without regard to
the kind of judicial business to be attended to, was changed,
and one justice was authorized to preside at jury trials and was
constituted a quorum for certain specified purposes. Schedules
May Session, 1852, p. xi5. This enabled the different justices
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to hold court at the same time in the same or in different coun-
ties, reserving for the full bench appeals in questions of law and
also all equity cases. A still further extension of this system
has led in recent years to the division of the Supreme Court
itself, concerning which more will be said later.
Another failure to keep the Supreme Court separate from all
others was made in 1843, when the courts of common pleas were
re-organized, and were made to consist of a justice of the
Supreme Court as the chief justice thereof, with two associates
chosen annually by the General Assembly from the different
counties.
In 1848 the two associates were dispensed with, and ever
since then the judge of the court of common pleas has been one
of the justices of the Supreme Court. Schedules, May, 1848, p. 7.
The right of the General Assembly to act as a court of
appeals, to exercise prerogative powers over the proceedings of
the courts of the colony or to give relief as a court of chancery,
was denied by the home authorities and was occasionally
repudiated by the General Assembly itself.
Thus in 1678 a petition was preferred to the General Assem-
bly to reverse a judgment for the defendant in the case of
Sanford v. Foster that had been tried twice in the general court
of trials. The General Assembly refused to interfere, declar-
ing by their vote, "This Assembly conceive that it doth not
properly belong to them, or is any wise within their recog-
nizance, to judge or reverse any sentence or judgment passed
by the General Court of Tryalls accordinglo law except capitall
or criminall cases or mulcts or fines." 3 Col. Recs. 19.
In May, 168o, however, the General Assembly voted, "that
in all actional cases brought to the Generall Court of Tryalls; if
either plaintiff or defendant be aggrieved, after judgment
entered in court, they may have liberty to make their appeale
to the next Generall Assembly for reliefe, provided such appeale
be made in the Recorder's office tenn days' time after judgment
entered as aforesaid; as alsoe such person or persons so appeal-
inge, shall first pay costs of court, and give in bond as in case
of review, and thereupon execution shall be stopped till the
determination of the Assembly be knowne." 3 Col. Recs. 87.
It is to be borne in mind that the court of trials from which
the right of appeal to the General Assembly was thus given,
was composed of the governor and the assistants, one from
each town, who then sat in the General Assembly as members
of that body, and who were constituted a separate house of the
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General Assembly, by an act passed at the May session of the
General Assembly, z696. 3 Col. Recs. 313. This would seem
to be the effect of this act, for it does not expressly provide
that the upper house shall sit by itself,only that "all the Deputies
of each respective town shall sit as a House of Deputies for the
future and have liberty to choose their Speaker among them-
selves and likewise the Clerk of the Deputies; and that the
majority of the Deputies so assembled, shall be accounted a
lawful House of Deputies." 3 Col. Recs. 313.
The evolution of the Senate in Rhode Island forms a curious
chapter in our history. It had been the custom to allow
ex-assistants to sit in the General Assembly, in the absence of
a full delegation from any town. In x666 the towns of Ports-
mouth and Warwick petitioned the General Assembly that the
deputies, or, as we now call them, the representatives, should
sit apart from the magistrates as a house by themselves. This
was enacted that year (2 Col. Recs. 144), but the act was soon
repealed-in 1672 (2 Col. Recs. 4 7 )-and the two continued to
sit together, until the Act of x696.
The charter of Charles II provided there should be ten
assistants to be chosen by a general ticket. When the Town of
Kingstown was divided into two towns in 1722, the General
Assembly provided that each of them should have one assistant
and hence arose the custom of choosing the assistants, one from
each town. This has continued to the present time in the con-
stitution of the State Senate, composed of one member from
every town in the state. 2 Arnold, Hist. of R. I. 7o. This
body was for a long time called the Council. In 1789 (do., 555)
it was called the Upper House. This tendency towards one
assistant from each town was a reversion to the custom estab-
lished under the charter of 1643.
In z688-9 instructions were given by the Board of Trade in
England to the Earl of Bellomont, Governor of New York, Con-
necticut and Massachusetts, to inquire into and to report upon
complaints made against this colony for the independent
manner in which its affairs were managed. In his letter to the
Board of Trade, dated November 27, i689, he wrote:
"§II. The Generall Assembly assume a judicial power of
hearing trying and determining of civil causes, removing them
out of the ordinary Courts of Justice and way of tryall, accord-
ing to the course of the common law, alter and reverse verdicts
and judgments. The Charter committing no judiciall power
and authority unto them. . . ." 3 Col. Recs. 386.
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One of the most peculiar features of the judicial system of
Rhode Island has always been and now is, its probate system.
In 1647 the head officer of the town had probate jurisdiction(i Col. Recs. Y88). but the office of head officer was abolished
and in r674 the town councils became probate courts. 2 Col.
Recs. 525. If one died intestate, the code of 1647 vested power
in the town council sitting as a court of probate, to dispose of
his property. Judge Staples called attention to one case in
Providence where the council thus disposed of part of the real
and personal estate to the widow, part for life and part in fee,
and divided the residue among the children as tenants in tail
general, with cross remainders. * This extraordinary power
placed in the hands of men who were not lawyers, was made
subject to appeal to the Senate or Governor and Council, in
z663, as "Supreme Ordinary of Judge of Probate" and this
continued until X822 (P. L., 1822, p. 212). when appeal could
be taken to the supreme judical court and afterwards to the
Supreme Court. This is the system still existing, except that
in the cities and some towns, as population has increased, a
probate court of one judge who is a lawyer, has been insti-
tuted. Despite the encomium of Judge Durfee (Gleanings
from the Judicial History of Rhode Island 33), the system is
far from ideal, and the commissioners who made the last
revision, recognizing the faults of the system, proposed a
different one, that was laid to rest, however, in the General
Assembly. The fees allowed to the members of the town
councils, when they sit as probate judges, may account in part
at least, for the reluctance to change the system, and for the
defeat of the draft of a reformed probate system proposed by
the commissioners appointed in 189o to revise the statutes, and
submitted by them to the General Assembly. It is probable
that the commission upon the revision of our judicial system
will recommend important changes in its report this winter to
the General Assembly.
In addition to the delegation of equity powers by the Gen-
eral Assembly to our courts, the General Assembly itself con-
tinued to exercise equity powers directly until the decision in
Taylor v. Place, 4 R. I. 324, after the adoption of the present
constitution, put an end to it. One reason why equity powers
* "The Proceedings of the First General Assembly of 'The Incorporation
of Providence Plantations' and the Code of Laws adopted by that Assembly
in x647," by William R. Staples, 1847.
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were slow in developing in this country, in addition to the
reasons already given, is because the principles of equity juris-
prudence and jurisdiction, as well as the system of equity
pleadings, were also of slow and late development in England.
Lord Nottingham, "the father of equity," became Chancellor
in 1673. It was not until 1756, when Lord Hardwicke ter-
minated his twenty years' service as Chancellor, that equity
became molded into something like a rational system of juris-
prudence. The sources from which a knowledge of its prin-
ciples, the scope of its jurisdiction, as well as of the methods of
procedure and of the rules of equity pleading and practice,
were derived, were known only to the few persons in actual
practice in equity courts, and to those having access to the
manuscript notes that a few judges and solicitors were indus-
trious and enterprising enough to make. No separate treaties
on equity existed until after our separation from the mother
country, and that is recognized as the time when law in the
United States branched off from its source. From that time
English statutes ceased to apply here and English precedents,
although cited and treated with respect, ceased to be necessarily
followed, or to be admitted to be absolute authority. Cathcart
v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 28o, by Marshall, C. J. Blackstone's Com-
mentaries appeared from x756 to 1769. In writing of equity he
says it deserves a more complete explanation, "Yet as nothing
is hitherto extant that can give a stranger a tolerable idea of
the courts of equity subsisting in England, as distinguished
from the courts of law, the compiler of these observations
cannot but attempt to make it with diffidence; those who know
them best are too much employed to find time to write, and
those who have attended but little in those courts must be often
at a loss for materials." Bl. Comm., Bk. III, p. 429.
These facts are enough to account for the slow growth of
equity, not only in Rhode Island, but in the American colonies
generally, the absence of courts of chancery until in colonial his-
tory, and the informal and anomalous methods of administer-
ing equity that prevailed, but it is nevertheless evident that
although little understood and irregularly administered, equity
jurisprudence was a recognized part of the general system of
the law of Rhode Island, as well as that of the other English
colonies.
The General Assembly claimed that it was in itself a court
of equity and that it continued to be such a court by an act
passed in 1705 (3 Col Recs. 55o) entited,"An Act for the General
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Assembly to be continued to be a Court of Chancery, untill
such time as a Court of Chancery can be created."
The Act is as follows:
"Whereas, it hath been represented to this Assembly the
great benefit that it might be, to have a Court of Chancery
erected and settled in this her Majesty's Collony; but this
Assembly having considered the rules and methods for the way
and proceedings in such a Court, with the rules and const-itu-
tions thereof, being of great weight and concernment, and
requires mature consideration for orderly settling thereof, which
we conceive cannot at present at this Assembly be settled:
"Therefore be it enacted by the Honorable the Governor
with the House of Magistrates and Representatives convened
in Generall Assembly, and it is hereby enacted by the authority
of the same, That the Generall Assembly at all times con-
vened in Generall Assembly, shall be a Court of Chancery as
formerly it hath been, until such time as a more proper Court
of Chancery may be conveniently erected and settled."
We are fortunate in having the record easily accessible of a
case, that of Brenton v. Remington, in which the General Assem-
bly exercised jurisdiction as a Court of Chancery. As a con-
crete example illustrative of this exercise of jurisdiction, let us
examine this case. Brenton brought an action in trespass and
ejectment against Remington, to recover a tract of land that
Remington had held for more than twenty years under a mort-
gage given by Brenton when owner of the land. Judgment was
rendered against Brenton in the Court of Trials, whereupon he
appealed to the General Assembly, which "being resolved into
a General Committee," allowed Brenton to redeem on paying
the debt and interest-that is to say, it treated Brenton's appeal
as a petition in equity to redeem-in itself a sufficiently
remarkable performance to a lawyer of our times.
The report of the proceedings is as follows
"Both houses being full, resolved into a grand committee,
to hear appeals.
"Jahleel Brenton, Esq., appellant, Capt. Stephen Reming-
ton, appellee; the vote of the Assembly is as followeth, viz:
"Jahleel Brenton, of Newport, eldest son, and executor of
the last will and testament of William Brenton, Esq., deceased,
otherwise called Jahleel Brenton, of Newport, aforesaid, Esq.,
appealing .to this Assembly, as a Court of Chancery, for relief
against Capt. Stephen Remington, of Jamestown, appellee, for
withholding from said appellant a certain tract or parcel of
land in the Town of Jamestown, alias Cononicutt, in said
colony. The said appellant also praying that the judgments of
courts and verdict of juries against the appellant, in an action
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of trespass and ejectment, brought by the appellant against
the appellee, at the Court of Trials, in March and September
last past, for illegally withholding from (the said) appellant,
the said tracts or parcels of land, aforesaid, of two hundred and
fifty-six acres, more or less, may be reversed, and that the
appellant may be put in possession of said tracts or parcels of
land.
"This Assembly being resolved into a grand committee. as
aforesaid, and settled a Court of Chancery or Equity, and hear-
ing the several papers, evidences, and pleas on both sides, and
maturely weighing and considering the same, with the circum-
stances and equity of the whole case; and whereas, the said
appellant hath produced several laws which doth plainly hold
forth, that upon extraordinary occasion, the mortgager shall
have liberty to redeem a mortgage, notwithstanding the twenty
years being passed; being the time limited in the law for the
redemption of mortgages; and this case appearing to us to be
extraordinary:
"Be it therefore enacted by this present Assembly and the
authority thereof, that the said Jahleel Brenton, appellant, hath
hereby liberty to redeem the mortgage of the above said lands
and premises, he paying the principal money, with the interest,
and lawful charges thereon, according to the purport of said
mortgage; and the appellee to pay the charges in this Assembly.
"Upon which vote of the Assembly, Major Nathaniel Cod-
dington, one of the attornies for the appellee, appeals to her
Majesty in Council, in the Kingdom of Great Britain." 4 Col.
Recs. 48.
The subsequent "Proceedings of the General Assembly held
for the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, at
Newport the 27th day of February, 1711-12 (4 Col. Recs. 136),
were as follows:
"Whereas, this Assembly having taken into their serious
consideration their jurisdiction and authority as an Assembly,
for the trial and determination of appeals from the Court of
Trials, especially respecting title of land; together with the
judgment and determination of her Majesty and council upon
the appeal of Remington against Brenton, wherein the proceed-
ings of the Assembly were utterly condemned:
"Whereupon, notwithstanding a former act of this colony,
which hath constituted and empowered the Assembly to be a
Court of Chancery, we judge that they had no power or
authority to make any such law, by reason we cannot find any
precedent, that the legislators or Parliament of Great Britain,
after they had passed an act or law, took upon themselves the
executive power or authority of constituting themselves the
Court of Chancery, or any other Court of Judicature:-
"Yet, notwithstanding, considering the power and authority
of the General Assembly of this colony, grauted them by, and
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in our royal charter, do find that their power and authority is
very large, and copious as legislative, to make laws and con-
stitute courts of judicature for trial and decision of all matters
and cases happening within this colony or government, as they
shall judge proper, according to the constitution thereof, so as
they be not repugnant, but as near as may be agreeable to the
laws of England:
"Therefore, be it enacted by this present Assembly, and the
authority thereof and it is hereby enacted, that the law of this
colony, which constitutes, authorizes and empowers the Assem-
bly to be a Court of Chancery, shall be, and is hereby repealed,
made null and void, and of none effect; and that no appeal
from the Court of Tryals for the future, be granted, allowed or
brought before the Assembly of this Colony; and that the gen-
tlemen appealing to this Assembly be dismissed, without any
cost, save officers' fees.
"And also, that the Assembly of this colony, according to,
and by virtue of their power and authority afore recited, shall
erect, set up and establish a regular Court of Chancery, within
this government according to the methods and precedents of
Great Britain; any act or acts, law or laws of this government
to the contrary thereof, in any wise notwithstanding.
"Always provided, the said appeals may be by way of peti-
tion to this, or any other Assembly in this colony, have reliefin any matter or thing that may be cognizable before them; or
that may at any time hereafter, when a proper Court of Chan-
cery be stated, have their appeals continued to said court of
relief, if they shall think fit to prosecute the same."
In 1741 it had become so evident that there should be a change
made and that the General Assembly should cease to exercise
chancery powers, at least to a certain extent, that an act was
passed "for appointing and erecting a court of equity, to hear
and determine all appeals in personal actions from the judgment
of the superior court." 5 Col. Recs. 22.
A court of five judges was elected, to be chosen annually, to
hear all such appeals, "to give a determination on said appeals,
by affirming, reversing or altering the judgments of said
superior court, agreeably to law and equity, in as full and
extensive manner as the General Assembly hath been accus-
tomed to do."
.But for some reason that does not appear upon the record, it
would seem that this system did not work satisfactorily, for in
1744, this act was repealed, the preamble of the repealing act
stating: "It is found by experience that the trial of causes by
the said court of equity is inconvenient, and a great grievance
to the inhabitants of this colony."
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The General Assembly also assumed unto itself another of
the powers exercised by a court of equity--the power to punish
for contempt. In 1757 (6 Col Recs. 5) we find that-
"Whereas, Samuel Thayer who was apprehended and
brought before this Assembly, at their last session, for grossly
abusing them, has not yet made satisfaction for the same,-
"Be it therefore resolved by this General Assembly, and by
the authority thereof, it is resolved, that the said Samuel Thayer
be immediately apprehended and committed to his Majesty's jail,
in Providence, for his said abuse, and there remain confined,
until further orders from this Assembly."
It would seem, however, that Samuel Thayer had not been
imprisoned, for we find the order was repeated sixteen days
later. 5 Col; Rees. 15. A similar instance is to be found in
5 Col. Recs. 20, occurring the same year.
It is an undoubted fact that appeal lay to the privy council
in England and it is equally clear that the General Assembly
of this colony had no power whatever over such appeals. Yet
in 1771 the General Assembly attempted to limit this absolute
right, by a resolution "that no person or persons whatsoever,
shall hereafter be allowed or permitted to appeal to his Majesty
in Council in Great Britain, from the judgment of the superior
court of judicature in this colony, for any matter or thing what-
soever, unless the matter or thing in controversy be of the
value of $300 lawful money, to be valued by the court where
the appeal shall be prayed; any law, custom or usage to the
contrary hereof in any wise, notwithstanding." 7 Col. Recs. 33.
It is to be presumed that this was the act that was repealed
in x775. 7 Col. Rees. 355. Whether it was repealed because of
doubt as to the legality of the act or because it was intended to
put a stop to all appeals to the privy council does not appear.
This repealing act was passed in June, 1775, only two months
after the affair at Lexington and Concord and three years after
the destruction of the Gaspte.
Another interesting exercise of power by the General
Assefnbly is shown by the act passed in 1780 (9 Col. Recs. 156),
establishing a court of admiralty in this state. When we joined
the Union nine years later, of course all jurisdiction in admir-
alty became vested in the courts established in pursuance of
the Constitution and this ended the exercise of power over
admiralty matters by the General Assembly. It is one of the
curiosities of legislation in Rhode Island that the Code of 1647
adopted the Laws of Oleron. "It is ordered that the Sea Lawes
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otherwise called the Lawes of Oleron shall be in force among
us for the benefit of Seamen (vpon ye Island) and the Chief
Officers in the Towne shall have power to summon the Court
and determine the cause or causes presented." i Col. Recs. iSi.
As this was never repealed, it follows that these laws remained
in force until Rhode Island lost jurisdiction over all matters in
admiralty by the adoption of the Constitution of the United
States.
The Constitution of this state, adopted in 1842, brought
about great changes in the exercise of judicial powers by the
General Assembly, although it was not until the decision by
Judge Ames in the great case of Taylor v. Place in 1854 (4 R. I.
324) that the General Assembly was brought to a realizing
sense of the fact that it could no longer exercise judicial powers
either in law or equity.
Article III of the Constitution provides that "the powers of
the government shall be distributed into three departments-
the legislative, executiv'e and judicial."
Article X, Section i, provides, "The judicial power of this
state shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior
courts as the general assembly may from time to time, ordain.
and establish."
Here was no express explicit statement that the General
Assembly should no longer exercise any judicial power. Partly
because of this omission, partly because the General Assembly
always had exercised judicial powers, it continued still to exer-
cise them after the adoption of the Constitution, sheltering
itself under the vague Section io of Article IV: "The General
Assembly shall continue to exercise the powers they have here-
tofore exercised, unless prohibited in this Constitution."
The case of Taylor v. Place (4 R. I. 324), was brought to the
Supreme Court in i856 to test the constitutionality of an act of
the General Assembly granting a new trial in a case brought by
the Places in consequence of their having petitioned for such a
new trial, the case having been decided against them. James
Tillinghast was attorney for the Taylors, who were resisting the
attempt to grant a new trial and who therefore maintained that
the General Assembly could not grant a new trial, as that
would be the exercise of judicial power which is forbidden by
the Constitution. With Mr. Tillinghast, who is still with us,
in the active practice of his profession, was associated Charles
S. Bradley, afterwards Chief Justice. So ingrained was the
notion in Rhode Island at the time that notwithstanding the
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Constitution, the General Assembly could still continue to exer-
cise judicial powers, even many members of the bar were
convinced that the court would sustain them in the exercise
thereof. But in a masterly decision that should be studied by
every educated man in Rhode Island, who would know the his-
tory of the state, Judge Ames held that ours is a government of
three coordinate departments-the legislative, the executive
and the judicial-and that the grant of judicial powers to the
judiciary is the exclusion of the right to its exercise by the
legislature.
In 1822 th*e Supreme Judicial Court consisted of one chief
justice and four associate justices. The law provided that
"they or any three of them shall be a court," etc. Laws, 1822,
p. 107. It is obvious that under this law there could be but one
Supreme Court, and this was as it should be. But Pub. Laws,
1844, p. 92, state, "Sec. 13. Said court shall consist of one chief
justice and three associate justices, and they or any two of
them shall be a court," etc.
It is obvious that if two judges should constitute a court
under this section, there could be two supreme courts at the
same time, each composed of two judges. This is interesting
and also important, for we find here the germ of the difficulty
that finally culminated in the amendment to the Constitution
adopted 1903. The possibility of these two supreme courts
must have presented itself to the minds of the drafters of this
law, but they relied, in all probability, upon Article X, Section
i, of the Constitution, then only two years old, that provides
"The judicial power of this state shall be vested in one supreme
court," etc.
Of course it was not probable that two judges should call
themselves the court and that the other two should array them-
selves against them and say, "We are the court." In that
case either set of two judges had as valid a claim to be consid-
ered the court, as the other, but fortunately the difficulty never
arose. It is possible, however, whenever a quorum is consti-
tuted of less than a ma jority of the court with authority to hold
separate courts, as a "Division" by one or more of the justices.
Under the revision of the laws in 1857 the same possibilities
of difficulty were continued. Section i of Ch. x64 provided
that the Supreme Court shall consist of a chief justice and
three associate justices, while Section 28 provided that "any
two of said justices shall be a quorum of said court for all pur-
poses and business whatsoever." Under this language it might
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perhaps be claimed that in case of conflict, the first two judges
that met together, as they constituted a quorum, constituted
also the one supreme court contemplated by the Constitution.
In this case the victory would rest with the two judges that met
together first as the court, in an unseemly scramble or race for
the court house. The contingency never arose, but it was pos-
sible and such a possibility was never contemplated, when the
Constitution was drawn. Section 29 provided thbat. "The said
court may be held by different Justices thereof, at the same
time and in different places, in the same or some other county,
for all purposes, civil or criminal, proper to the court as con-
stituted."
The same state of things was continued under the revision
of 1872. Section i of Ch. i8 provided that, "The supreme
court shall consist of a chief justice and three associate justices.
to be elected, commissioned and to hold their offices as pre-
scribed in the constitution, and any two justices thereof shall
constitute a quorum. "
In 1875 the increase of business before our courts led to an
increase in their number. Ch. 458 of that year increased the
number of judges to four, and this was continued in the revision
of 1882. See Ch. 192, Sec. i. "The Supreme Court shall con-
sist of a chief justice and four associate justices, to be elected,
commissioned and to hold their offices as prescribed in the con-
stitution." Section 3 provided as before that "any two jus-
tices thereof shall be a quorum for all purposes whatsoever."
Although ten different combinations of the five judges were
possible, there could be but two courts sitting at the same
time, except in those minor affairs where the law provided that
one judge could sit alone. In May, 1891 (Ch. 983), another
associate justice was added to the court; in January, 1897 (Ch.
451), another was added and a quorum was made to consist of
three judges.
The Supreme Court still consists of the chief justice and
six associate justices. Of course, as the number of justices of
the court increases, while the number necessary to constitute a
quorum remains less than a majority of the whole number, with
power to divide the court, the possible number of supreme
courts increases rapidly. A radical change, but one of doubt-
ful validity, was made under the revision of 1893, due in part
to the fact that although we have continued to have a Supreme
Court and also a court of common pleas, the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court has never been limited to the proper functions
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of a supreme court, the determination of all questions of law
and of equity as a court of last resort, upon appeal from the
court below, but it has always been made also a court of first
instance concurrently with the court of common pleas, although,
as required by the Constitution, it has remained our only court
of equity. The radical change about to be explained was also
partly due to the fact above set forth, that a -quorum was made
up of less than a majority of all its members, thus leaving it
possible to have many supreme .courts. But this is practically
what has been done, for under the Judiciary Act and the revis-
ion of x896, the Supreme Court was split into two divisions-
the appellate division and the common pleas division-thus
mak.ing in effect, two courts out of the Supreme Court,
although the Constitution says there shall be but one supreme
court.
It was provided by the Judiciary Act (see Gen. Laws, Ch. 222)
that the appellate division of the Supreme Court should con-
sist of the chief justice and two associate justices to be desig-
nated from time to time by the chief justice. One judge was
constituted a quorum for certain purposes; three, a quorum for
all purposes, and two, when both parties consented.
When another judge was added to the court by Ch. 451 in
January, 1897, no change was made in this respect.
The common pleas division of the Supreme Court was
made to consist of the four remaining judges and one judge
was made a quorum for all purposes. Ch. 223. It was pro-
vided "that whenever practicable as many more than three as
possible of all the justices of the Supreme Court shall sit in the
appellate division in the hearing and determination of consti-
tutional questions." In this respect the Supreme Court
remained the Supreme Court contemplated in the Constitution.
There has been increasing dissatisfaction among the mem-
bers of the bar with this condition of the judiciary system. It
was felt that it ought not to be possible to get around the pro-
vision of the Constitution that there shall be "one Supreme
Court" by the simple expedient of splitting up the Supreme
Court into separate courts and calling each one a division of the
Supreme Court. Any attempt to divide a court that the Con-
stitution declares is one court, must be illegal. The jurisdiction
vested by the Constitution in this one court, cannot, by any
device, be taken away from the whole of this one court and
parceled out among divisions thereof. It follows that the
appellate division of the Supreme Court created under General
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Laws Ch. 222 (amended, Pub. Laws, Ch. 451), is not the
Supreme Court contemplated by the Constitution. Neverthe.
less, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of such legislation
in the case of _Mfainz v. Lederer, 24 R. I., 166, in 1902, and
decided that the Act of the General Assembly, creating an
appellate division of the Supreme Court and limiting the num-
ber of its justices to four, is constitutional, although the
Supreme Court consists of seven justices.
A similar attempt about twenty years ago, to divide the
Supreme Court of the United States, in order to lighten its
labors, failed to meet with the approval of the bar. See the
discussion thereon in the Reports of the American Bar Associa-
tion from 1882 to x885.
The case of Floydv. Quinn, 24 R. I. 147, in 19o2, is another
of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, the
effect of which is still further to subordinate the court to the
will of the legislature. The Court held that under the State
Constitution, Article X, Section 2, providing, "The several
courts shall have such jurisdiction as may from time to time be
prescribed by law," the General Assembly can regulate the
jurisdiction of all the courts, and can give full jurisdiction to a
minority of the justices to act for the court.
If the argument is sound that the one court established by
the State Constitution cannot be broken up into separate courts
by'calling them divisions of the Supreme Court, it follows that
chancery powers can be exercised only by the "one Supreme
Court" established by Article io, Section i. Section z provides
"Chancery powers may be conferred on the Supreme Court,
but on no other court to any greater extent than is now pro-
vided by law." In Williams v. Stearns, 126 Fed. Rep. 211, it was
claimed that the decree in equity rendered by the three justices
constituting the appellate division of the Supreme Court,
sitting in equity, is not a decree in the exercise of the chancery
powers conferred by the Constitution upon the Supreme Court,
because not passed by a majority of the justices of the Supreme
Court sitting in equity. The decree was contested in the
United States Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island,
upon the ground that the course of the State Supreme Court
was not "due process of law." The United States Court
declined to grant relief.
To allay the feeling of dissatisfaction and to remove any
possible doubt of constitutionality, as well as for other
reasons, the General Assembly passed a resolution on March
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29, z9oi, to submit to the people an amendment to the Consti-
tution, the effect of which would be to embody in the Consti-
tution itself the existing division of the Supreme Court into an
appellate division and a common pleas division.
But the general sentiment of the bar was against it and at a
business meeting of the Rhode Island Bar Association, held in
the Court House in Providence, December 14, 1901, upon the
suggestion of James Tillinghast, Esq., the president of the
association, Francis Colwell, Esq., was authorized to appoint a
committee of five members to consider this matter and to report
at a later* meeting. The committee was appointed, consisting
of Messrs. James Tillinghast, Edward D. Bassett, Walter H.
Barney, Chatles E. Gorman and William A. Morgan.
They submitted their report January II, 1902, at a business
meeting of the Bar Association, reporting adversely as to the
amendment proposed and submitting and recommending sub-
stantially the amendment since then adopted. Their report
was adopted and the committee was instructed to appear before
the General Assembly, to ask for the indefinite postponement
of the measure proposed by the General Assembly and the
adoption in its place of the measure proposed by the Bar Asso-
ciation. Aided by the lawyers in the General Assembly, by
Governor Garvin, then a member of the House, and others, they
succeeded, the amendment proposed was submitted by the
General Assembly, to the electors and was accepted by the
voters November 3, 1903. It is as follows:
ARTICLE XII.
"Section I. The supreme court shall have final revisory and
appellate jurisdiction upon. all questions of law and equity. It
shall have power to issue prerogative writs, and shall also have
such other jurisdiction as may, from time to time, be pre-
scribed by law. A majority of its judges shall always be
necessary to constitute a quorum. The inferior courts shall
have such jurisdiction as may, from time to time be prescribed
by law.
"Sec. 2. The judges of the supreme court shall give their
written opinion upon any question of law whenever requested
by the Governor or by either house of the goeneral assembly.
"Sec. 3. Sections i and 2 of this amendment shall take, in
the constitution of the state, the place of sections 2 and 3 of
Article X., entitled "Of the Judicial Power," which sections
are hereby annulled.
"See. 4. Section 3 of Article XIV of the constitution of the
state, entitled, 'Of the Adoption of this Constitution' is hereby
annulled.
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"'Sec. 5. The general assembly shall provide by law for
carrying this amendment into effect, and until such provision
shall be made the supreme court, as organized at the time of
the adoption .of this amendment, shall continue to have and
exercise the same powers and jurisdiction which it shall then
have under such organization."
During the winter of 1904 the General Assembly appointed
a commission to revise the judicial system of the state and their
report will be submitted to the General Assembly at its session
in January, x9o5. The way is clear at last for the establish-
ment of a real court of appeals, a court of last resort, a quorum
of which shall be constituted of a majority of all its members
and whose function it shall be to hear and determine questions
of law and of equity upon appeal.
Amzasa A. .Eaton.
